

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 17999

IO

Rec'd: October 25, 1962  
3:07 a.m.

Info

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

SS

SR

NO: 1451, October 24, Midnight

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1451, INFORMATION GENEVA 118.

ARA

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USUN DAILY CLASSIFIED SUMMARY NO. 61

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CUBA --

DAC

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USUN BRIEFING RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF AFRICANS, PROMPTING THEM TO TAKE MORE REALISTIC ATTITUDE ON CUBAN PROBLEM, MALAYAN AMBASSADOR INDICATED. EARLIER, MALAYAN REPRESENTATIVE REPORTED GREAT NUMBER ASAFA'S THOUGHT US "WRONG" IN CUBA CRISIS.

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RMR

FOLLOWING MCCLOY BRIEFING OF AFRICAN AND ARAB REPRESENTATIVES, STEVENSON TOLD SELECTED MEMBERS OF GROUP HE SAW NO WAY TO DEAL WITH THEIR CONCERN OVER CONFLICT ARISING FROM INTERCEPTION OF SOVIET SHIPS OTHER THAN FOR USSR TURN BACK SHIPS. PRESSURE OF OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT HELP CONVINCE SOVIETS DO THIS, HE SUGGESTED, AFTER [REDACTED] ASKED WHETHER IT POSSIBLE CONCENTRATE ON THIS ISSUE. [REDACTED] SUGGESTED

POSSIBILITY ADDING UN PATROL TO US FLEET WITH UN SHIP GIVING ORDER TO SOVIET SHIPS TO STOP. SAID HE UNDERSTOOD US MIGHT AGREE TO THIS BUT CONCEDED IT WOULD NOT COVER QUESTION OF DISMANTLING EXISTING BASES.

[REDACTED] RAISED THESE POINTS AFTER STEVENSON EXPLAINED IN DETAIL WHY US INSIST ON INSPECTION AND ASSURANCES IT COULD DEPEND UPON BEFORE CALLING OFF QUARANTINE, AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF TIME FACTOR AS REASON WHY UNCONTROLLED COOLING-OFF PERIOD UNACCEPTABLE.

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-2- 1451, October 24, Midnight from New York

ROSSIDES (CYPRUS), WHO CHAIRED SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED GROUP NIGHT MEETING OCT 23 WHICH INCLUDED BELGRADE COUNTRIES, FIVE LA'S, REPRESENTATIVES AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND NIGERIA, INDICATED HE JOINED WITH REPRESENTATIVES GHANA AND UAR IN REPORTING TO SYG IT WAS SENSE OF GROUP THAT SYG SHOULD ADDRESS APPEAL TO KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV.

ASAF'S DECIDED OCT 24 SCRAP IDEA SPONSORING CUBAN RESOLUTION IN FAVOR REQUEST TO SYG THANT APPEAL BOTH US AND USSR, GRIMES (LIBERIA) TOLD ROWAN.

[ ] EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION, WHICH HE SAID SHARED BY OTHER ASAF'S, THAT USSR SHOULD BE PRESSED TURN SHIPS AROUND AND HALT FURTHER SHIPPING TO CUBA IN EXCHANGE FOR US AGREEMENT LIFT QUARANTINE. US, USSR AND CUBA COULD THEN HOLD DISCUSSIONS ON DISMANTLING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ALREADY THERE, HE POINTED OUT.

ASAF'S DOUBT ABILITY GET USSR HALT SHIPS BUT ANYTHING ELSE SEEMS TO BE COLLISION COURSE, GRIMES COMMENTED.

AMBASSADORS PANAMA, PERU, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, EL SALVADOR, AND PARAGUAY ADVISED USUN THEY WOULD URGENTLY RECOMMEND THEIR GOVERNMENTS ANNOUNCE SUPPORT FOR US QUARANTINE MEASURES ALONG LINES ALREADY ANNOUNCED BY ARGENTINA AND COSTA RICA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR NON-COMMITTAL.

ALTHOUGH VISABLY WORRIED AND INDECISIVE, [ ] SAID HE GATHERED FROM ZORIN'S (USSR) SC SPEECH USSR HAD NOT DECIDED WHAT TO DO. IN FACT, SOVIETS "SEEMED TO BE TERRIFIED", HE ADDED. [ ] SAID HE DROPPED INTO NON-ALIGNED MEETING FOR FEW MINUTES CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY COMMENTING WAS SHAME BAY OF PIGS DID NOT SUCCEED.

[ ] SPECULATED USSR MIGHT YIELD TO FORCE MAJEURE OF US BOARDING PARTIES AND PERMIT VESSELS BE SAILED TO US PORTS. HE SUGGESTED THIS MIGHT APPEAL TO THEM SINCE NO ONE GET KILLED AND THEY WOULD MAKE GREAT DEAL OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROPAGANDA AND GAIN TIME FOR MANEUVERING IN UN AND ON BASIC DECISIONS ON FATE CUBAN BASES.

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[REDACTED] IN DISCUSSION WITH USUN, [REDACTED] GAVE IMPRESSION FOLLOWING  
[REDACTED] SC MEETING OCT 23 THAT FIRM US STAND CAME AS A SURPRISE AND  
[REDACTED] SHOCK TO USSR. HE APPEARED NERVOUS AND TENSE, PREDICTING NEW  
[REDACTED] YORK BE BLOWN UP TOMORROW BY SOVIET NUCLEAR MISSLES. TEST  
[REDACTED] COME OCT 24 WHEN FIRST SHIP APPROACHING CUBA - POLTAVA - SCHEDULED  
[REDACTED] ARRIVE, HE EXPLAINED. [REDACTED]

EARLIER, TWO YUGOSLAV JOURNALISTS MADE CLEAR THEY REGARDED  
SITUATION AS VERY GRAVE BUT DOUBTED RUSSIANS RISK FULL-FLEDGED  
NUCLEAR WAR FOR CUBA.

FIRM US ACTION ON CUBA MEANT GREAT DEAL TO US  
ALLIES ALL OVER WORLD, DIESEL (GERMAN OBSERVER) ADVISED  
USUN. NOTING ALLIES HAD GIVEN OVERWHELMING SUPPORT, HE SAID  
CRUCIAL POINT NOW NOT TO RETREAT. RETREAT, HE ADDED,  
BE DISASTROUS SINCE IT WOULD ONCE AGAIN GIVE ALLIES  
IMPRESSION US VACILLATION.

NUCLEAR TESTING --

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-5- 1451, October 24, Midnight from New York

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Department of State

EX-127

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RIFAI AND ZINZOU RAISED THESE POINTS AFTER STEVENSON EXPLAINED IN DETAIL WHY US INSIST ON INSPECTION AND ASSURANCES IT COULD DEPEND UPON BEFORE CALLING OFF QUARANTINE, AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF TIME FACTOR AS REASON WHY UNCONTROLLED COOLING-OFF PERIOD UNACCEPTABLE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY

JK

DATE

3/30/88

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DELAY ( ) Non-responsive info. deleted

FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(6)

TS authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR

( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR

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